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Are Limited Liability Company Interests
Securities?
Mark A. Sargent*
I. INTRODUCTION
The limited liability company ("LLC") is one of the most interest-
ing forms of business organization developed in recent years.' At
first glance, the LLC may seem to be just another over-clever tax
dodge doomed to a brief career. Upon closer inspection, however, the
LLC actually seems to be worth taking seriously. This is so because
the LLC attempts to achieve two of the most fundamental goals pur-
sued by business planners.
First, the LLC permits the planner to choose between entity-level
taxation and pass-through taxation,2 allowing selection of the optimal
tax status without sacrificing limited liability. By allowing the plan-
ner to choose entity-level taxation (by forming a corporation) or pass-
through taxation (by forming an LLC) without submitting to the sub-
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to
thank Stuart Levine, my limited liability company guru, for all his help and Paul
Skalny for his research assistance. Thanks also to Richard Parker and Marc Stein-
berg, who commented on drafts of this article.
1. For a comprehensive study of the limited liability company see Robert R.
Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company, A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47
Bus. LAw. 378 (1992) [hereinafter Keatinge]. For a useful article, although dated by
the recent spate of LLC statute enactments, see Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, As-
sessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (1991). For single
state studies, see Jose M. Sariego, The Florida Limited Liability Company Revisiteck
An Alternative Form of Business, FLA. B. J., Nov. 1989, at 26; Alson R. Martin, The
Kansas Limited Liability Act - Business and Tax Considerations, 59 J. KAN. B. ASS'N
17 (1990); S. Brian Farmer & Louis A. Mezzullo, The Virginia Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 789 (1991); Joseph P. Fontana & Corey R. McCool, Com-
ment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alternative to the S
Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523 (1988).
2. For a concise explanation of the difference between 'pass-through entities such
as partnerships, which are not taxed at the entity level, and entities such as corpora-
tions, which are tixed at the entity level, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS
OF MODERN BUSINEss 294-96 (1989).
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stantive limitations and intellectual gymnastics of an S corporation3
or limited partnership status, the LLC promises to bring some ration-
ality to a disordered situation.
Second, the LLC, much like a general partnership, permits the
business planner great freedom to tailor governance and financial
arrangements to the owners' needs, while maintaining limited liabil-
ity for the owner. This much-desired flexibility unleashes the plan-
ner's ingenuity, allowing the limited liability-seeking owner to escape
the straitjacket of the mandatory provisions of the corporation stat-
utes and develop structures more suitable to life in a closely-held en-
terprise. The LLC statutes may thus meet much of the promise that
special close corporation statutes of the 1960s and 1970s left
unfulfilled.4
The promise of the LLC statutes, however, rests on tenuous foun-
dations. In order for the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to treat
an LLC as a pass-through entity for federal tax purposes, the LLC
must classify itself as a partnership and not as an association taxable
as a corporation.5 Until recently, the IRS position with respect to the
LLC seemed to be that it should not be classified as a partnership be-
cause no member of an LLC is liable for the entity's debts.6 Between
1988 and 1990, however, the IRS issued a single revenue ruling and a
short series of private letter rulings that apparently reversed this po-
sition and classified LLCs as partnerships. 7 These rulings, although
highly specific and contingent, encouraged greater use of existing
LLC statutes, and incited the enactment of similar statutes in other
jurisdictions, as the states scrambled to create a pass-through vehicle
that would enable entrepreneurs to exploit the post-1986 decline in
3. An "S corporation" avoids taxation at the entity level by qualifying as a "small
business corporation" and electing to be taxed under subchapter S of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 1361, 1366 (1982).
4. For a critical discussion of the fate of these statutes, see Dennis S. Karjala, A
Second Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1980);
Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States,
21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663 (1989); David L. Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act: An
Experiment that Failed, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 842 (1967); Ronald M. Shapiro, The Statu-
tory Close Corporation: A Critique and a Corporate Planning Alterative, 36 MD. L.
REV. 289 (1976) (critiquing Maryland's close corporation statute).
5. For more detailed discussion of this distinction and its relevance to the tax sta-
tus of LLCs, see Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible
Choice for Doing Business? 41 FLA. L. REV. 721, 724-39 (1989). See also infra notes 50-
75 and accompanying text.
6. The IRS took this position in a set of proposed regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709
(1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (proposing amendments including Prop.
Tress. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2)-(4)), which were later withdrawn. I.R.S. Announce-
ment 83-84, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31 (Dec. 16, 1982)).
7. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-010 (June 16, 1989); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-013 (April 25, 1990); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 90-29-019 (April 19, 1990); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-19-029 (May 10, 1991).
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personal income tax rates.8
As of this writing, eight states have given effect to LLC statutes,9
and LLC legislation is pending in approximately fifteen others.10
The fate of all this law-making will depend upon the IRS' and Con-
gress' continued willingness to treat LLCs as pass-through entities.
The device's practical importance, furthermore, will depend upon the
preservation of a corporate/personal income tax structure that favors
the use of pass-through forms of business organization.
The LLC raises fascinating questions on several levels. It in-
troduces new complications into the traditional choice of business
form analysis. It poses tantalizing planning opportunities. It gener-
ates knotty tax issues of a technical nature and surfaces the policy
question of whether a business organization's pass-through or non-
pass-through status should depend on the arcane and largely irrele-
vant factors central to the IRS' partnership/association dichotomy."
This article, however, will not focus on these intriguing issues, many
of which have been ably discussed elsewhere.12 Instead, this article
will consider whether the federal and state securities laws will treat
limited liability interests as securities.' 3
The question is obviously of great practical importance. If limited
liability interests are securities, they cannot be offered or sold with-
out registration or exemption therefrom under the securities laws.
In addition, their status as securities would trigger substantial disclo-
sure obligations and create the risk of liability under the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws. It thus makes sense to think about
whether interests in the new LLC entity will be treated as securities.
Part II of this article will set the stage for the definitional question
by reviewing what LLCs are and how they are intended to operate.14
Part III will provide the analytical context by describing how courts
8. For a summary of the impact of the tax reforms of the 1980s on the rate struc-
ture, see HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 264-71. For an explanation of why the use of a
pass-through entity is likely to be advantageous under the current, post-1986 rate
structure, see id. at 319-22.
9. For citation., to the LLC statutes in those states, see infra notes 17, 19 & 24-29.
10. See MARK A. SARGENT, THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK (forth-
coming in 1992).
11. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 1; Gazur & Goff, supra note 1; and Hamill,
supra note 5.
13. This question has received little attention. For brief, although thoughtful dis-
cussions, see Keatinge, supra note 1, at 403-04; Farmer & Mezzullo, supra note 1, at
828-30.
14. See infra notes 17-75 and accompanying text.
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have applied the key tests for the existence of a security to general
partnerships and limited partnerships, which are forms of business
organization somewhat analogous to LLCs.15 Finally, Part IV will
apply those tests to the LLC and demonstrate how this entity raises
subtle definitional questions. 16
II. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: A PRECIs
A. Origins and Proliferation
The Wyoming legislature enacted the first limited liability com-
pany legislation in 1977,17 with the usual hope of attracting busi-
nesses, or at least business franchises, to the state.' 8 Florida followed
suit in 1982, adopting a statutel9 modeled largely after the Wyoming
statute. The uncertainty surrounding the federal tax status of
LLCs,20 however, led to minimal use of the Wyoming2l and Florida22
devices, and forestalled adoption of similar statutes in other
jurisdictions.
The IRS broke this deadlock in 1988 with Revenue Ruling 88-76,23
which classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for federal tax pur-
poses. The ruling caused Colorado24 and Kansas25 to adopt their own
LLC statutes, soon followed by Nevada,26, Texas,27 Utah28 and Vir-
ginia.29 As stated above,3 0 this pattern of enactments can be expected
to continue so long as the IRS maintains its position on the partner-
ship status of LLCs.
While there are numerous technical and substantive differences
among the several LLC statutes, 31 they show a tendency toward rela-
15. See infra notes 76-171 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 172-202 and accompanying text.
17. Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977). For discussion of the little-known "lim-
ited partnership association" as a precursor to the LLC, see Keatinge, supra note 1, at
381-84.
18. Gazur & Goff, supra note 1, at 389.
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.471 (West Supp. 1991).
20. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 50-75 and ac-
companying text.
21. Only 26 Wyoming LLCs had been established as of February 22, 1988. Fontana
& McCool, supra note 1, at 523, 531.
22. Apparently, only two LLCs were formed in Florida in the year following adop-
tion of the LLC statute. Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 387, 388 (1983). For discussion of this phenomenon, see Sariego, supra note
1, at 26.
23. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
24. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -913 (Supp. 1990).
25. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1991).
26. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.276-.332 (Michie Supp. 1991).
27. 1991 TEx. SESs. LAw SERV. 901 (Vernon) (referring to H.B. 278, § 46).
28. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -156 (Supp. 1991).
29. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1069 (Michie Supp. 1991).
30. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
31. For a detailed survey of the differences among the Wyoming, Florida and Col-
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tive uniformity, if only because departures from the dominant format
might raise questions about the tax status of entities organized under
the individual state statutes. The tendency toward uniformity should
be reinforced by the American Bar Association's Section of Business,
Law, which has a subcommittee drafting a prototype LLC statute,32
and by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL), which has formed a drafting committee charged
with producing a uniform LLC act.33
B. Fundamental Characteristics
The leading commentators on LLCs have summarized the LLC as
"a non-corporate business [form] that provides its members with lim-
ited liability and allows the members to participate actively in the en-
tity's management."3 4 This succinct definition reveals the entity's
basic characteristics.
As a non-corporate form of business, the LLC has been designed to
avoid double taxation and to permit pass-through of income and
losses for tax purposes. It also avoids the application of the
mandatory provisions of corporation statutes that require boards of
directors and officers, and the attendant paraphernalia relating to
meetings and voting rights. As a non-corporation, the LLC also can
duck application of the corporation statutes' various legal capital3 5
provisions governing the corporate financial structure. This provides
a degree of flexibility in management and financial planning hereto-
fore found principally in general partnerships.
Unlike general partners, however, the members of an LLC have
shareholder-type limited liability. The LLC thus has a hybrid char-
acter. Like a general partnership, it is highly flexible and
"tailorable," and it is not (so far) taxable at the entity level. Like a
corporation, it provides limited liability to its owners. Partnership/
corporation hybrids, of course, are nothing new. The limited partner-
orado statutes, see Gazur & Goff, supra note 1, at 472-501. For a comprehensive com-
parison of eight statutes, see Keatinge, supra note 1, at 409-23.
32. Marshall B. Paul & Stuart Levine, Choosing a State of Organization for a
Limited Liability Company, 62 PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus. BULL., Nov. 26, 1991, at
24.1.
33. For a discussion of the background to that decision, see Keatinge, supra note 1,
at 456-57; Farmer & Mezzullo, supra note 1, at 791.
34. Keatinge, supra note 1, at 384 (footnote omitted).
35. The last word on par value, stated capital and other corporate legal capital
concepts can be found in BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL
(3d ed. 1990).
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ship has been around for a long time.36 The great advantage of the
LLC, however, is that its members, unlike limited partners,3 7 have
no restrictions on their right to participate in control of the business.
In addition, there is no need to have a member or other participant
that would have unlimited liability similar to that of a general part-
ner of a limited partnership.3 8
The flexibility allowed to LLCs deserves particular emphasis. The
LLC statutes contain no rules governing the issuance of ownership
interests, the creation of classes or series of interests, or the alloca-
tion of equity contributions to stated capital or capital surplus ac-
counts. There are also no statutory rules concerning differential
treatment of holders of the same class or series of interest as there
are under the corporation statutes.39 This hands-off approach leaves
virtually all of the essential elements of the capital structure to be
determined by the parties, with results reflected in an "operating
agreement" 40 that is roughly analogous to a general partnership
agreement.
Similarly, the LLC statutes abandon the corporation statutes'
mandatory hierarchy of shareholders, directors and officers. The
statutes thus eliminate the numerous distinctions over who has the
authority to amend the articles or bylaws, elect or remove the man-
agers of the organization, or authorize distribution of earnings.
Whole bodies of corporate law doctrine, such as the rule invalidating
36. For a discussion of the nineteenth century origins of limited partnerships in
the United States, see the Official Comment to section 1 of the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act of 1916 ("ULPA"), UNIFIED LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, 6 U.L.A. 562-
63 (1969) (act revised in 1976 and amended in 1985).
37. Compare the strict rule contained in section 7 of the ULPA, 6 U.L.A. 582
(1969), stating, "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless,
in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part
in the control of the business," Id. (applied in Holzman v. DeEscamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d
858, 195 P.2d 833 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)) with the safe harbor rule of section 303 of
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 ("RULPA"), 6 U.L.A. 325-26
(Supp. 1991). which permits a substantially greater level of limited partner control.
For an application of the RULPA approach, see Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Partridge Assoc., 679 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1987). Note also that the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has approved amendments to
RULPA, which include some modifications of section 303. RULPA § 303, 6 U.L.A. 325-
26, 415 (Supp. 1991). For critique of the control concept under the limited partnership
statutes, see Joseph J. Basile, Jr., Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An Argu-
ment for Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1985). RULPA and the
1985 amendments thereto have reduced the risk that a limited partner might lose lim-
ited liability status by participating in control, but the LLC has apparently eliminated
that risk for its members.
38. See ULPA § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969); RULPA § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 345 (Supp.
1991).
39. Keatinge, supra note 1 at 386.
40. For examples of such operating agreements, see MARK A. SARGENT, THE LIM-
ITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK (forthcoming in 1992).
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board-sterilizing agreements, are also rendered irrelevant.41 The
statutes also allow the owners of the business to use the operating
agreement to set up the management of the entity in a manner far
less restrictive than would be permitted by the special close corpora-
tion statutes, which generally share the same goal of circumventing
the mandatory provisions of the general corporation statute to facili-
tate managerial flexibility.42
The depth of this flexibility with respect to management of the
LLC is profound. In essence, the LLC statutes permit business own-
ers to avoid mandatory intermediary management structures (such as
boards of directors)43 and to run the business directly on any organi-
41. This rule prohibits agreements that would "sterilize" the board by binding the
directors' votes with respect to matters within their authority (such as election of of-
ficers). Such agreements are distinguishable from shareholders' agreements, since
shareholders are permitted to bind their votes with respect to matters within their
purview (such as election of directors). The rationale for this distinction is that direc-
tors should somehow remain "independent"-a faintly absurd concept in the context
of close corporations. To trace the waffling development of this rule, see Somers v.
AAA Temporary Servs., Inc., 284 N.E.2d 462 (Ill. 1972) (holding that two sole share-
holders of close corporation did not have power to amend bylaws in order to reduce
number of director.; from three to two where such power was not reserved in articles
of incorporation); Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964) (holding that shareholder-
director restrictions are to be upheld in closely held corporation absent public injury,
complaining minority interest, or apparent injury to creditors); Long Park, Inc. v.
Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 77 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1948) (sterilizing restric-
tions deprive directors of all powers to select and supervise managment); McQuade v.
Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934) (invalidating shareholder agreement on grounds
that board must be left free to exercise its own business judgment); Manson v. Curtis,
119 N.E. 559 (N.Y. 1918) (holding that agreements among stockholders who constitute
minority in number, but who represent majority of shares, are valid and binding if
they do not contravene express charter or statutes).
One of the goals of some of the special close corporation statutes was to circumvent
the board sterilization problem by allowing elimination of the board of directors, ER-
NEST L. FOLK, III, THE GENERAL CORPORATION § 351 (1972), or by authorizing unani-
mous stockholders' agreements that could "regulate any aspect of the affairs of the
corporation," including matters traditionally relegated to the board. See, e.g., MD.
CORP. & ASs'NS CODE ANN. § 4-401 (1985 and Supp. 1991).
42. Special close corporation statutes that permit elimination of the board, see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983 and Supp. 1991), direct management through share-
holders agreements, see MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-401 (1985 & Supp. 1991),
or operation of the entity as a partnership, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (1983), obvi-
ously share this goal. The usefulness of these statutes, however, is undercut by strin-
gent eligibility criteria and excessive unanimity requirements. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 342 (1983 and Supp. 1991) (setting out eligibility criteria under close corporation
statute). For analysis of the eligibility issue, see Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y.
1980). For a critique of the various unanimity requirements under the Maryland close
corporation statute, see Shapiro, supra note 4, at 292-96.
43. Note that all of the LLC statutes except Colorado's provide that the firm will
be managed by LLC members unless the LLC's articles of organization provide other-
wise. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp.
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zational basis they wish. The members have the choice, however, of
providing in their articles of organization for delegation of their au-
thority to a group of managers. 44 In other words, the LLC members
can choose to manage the LLC directly themselves or indirectly
through managers. As shown below, this distinction may be impor-
tant for securities law purposes.
Despite all of this flexibility, LLCs are not purely informal vehi-
cles. The statutes all require a filing for an LLC to be formed,45 and
some of the statutes require the filings to make fairly substantial dis-
closures with respect to the entity's financing. 46 Some statutes limit
the LLC's duration to thirty years.47 LLCs in some states are re-
quired to maintain specified records. 48 In addition, the LLC statutes
contain default provisions, such as a provision requiring the LLC to
distribute income to LLC members in proportion to their contribu-
tions, unless the articles or operating agreement provide otherwise.49
The most substantive limitations on the flexibility of LLCs derive
from preconditions essential to the preservation of their tax status as
pass-through entities. In particular, the statutes must ensure that the
LLC lacks certain basic corporate characteristics. The need to meet
these federal tax preconditions imposes at least a modest constraint
1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.312 (Michie Supp. 1991); 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
901 (Vernon) (referring to H.B. 278, § 46, art. 2.12); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125
(Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116
(1977).
44. See, e.g., FLA. ST. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612
(Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.312 (Michie Supp. 1991); 1991 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 901 (Vernon) (referring to H.B. 278, § 48, art. 2.12); UTAH CODE ANN. § 43-26-125
(Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116
(1977). The Colorado statute, in contrast, states that the LLC must be managed by
managers. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401 (Supp. 1991). The Texas LLC statute takes an
intermediate position, providing that the LLC will be managed by managers unless the
members elect to exercise that authority themselves. 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 901
(Vernon) (referring to H.B. 278, § 46, art. 2.12).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-207(1)(a) (Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.409(1)
(West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7609 (Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.293 (Michie Supp. 1991); 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 901 (Vernon) (referring to H.B.
278, § 46, art. 3.03) (Vernon); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-118(1) (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1052 (Michie Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-109 (1977).
46. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.407 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. 817-15-107
(1977).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204(1)(b) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608-
407(1)(b) (West Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.290(b) (Michie Supp. 1991);
1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 901 (Vernon) (referring to H.B. 278, § 46, art. 3.02(2)); WYO.
STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(ii) (1977). It is likely, however, that newer statutes will abandon
the uniform 30-year limit in favor of a limit to be fixed in each LLC's articles of
organization.
48. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-411 (West Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.297 (Michie Supp. 1991).
49. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-503 (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1029 (Michie Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-119 (1977).
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on the ability to plan for problems of duration and termination of the
relations among the LLC and its members.
C. The Tax Tightrope
The IRS classifies unincorporated organizations as either partner-
ships or as associations taxable as corporations on the basis of
whether the organization possesses characteristics specified in the ap-
plicable regulations.0 The IRS will tax an unincorporated organiza-
tion as a corporation if, under all the circumstances, the entity has
more corporate characteristics than partnership characteristics.51
The characteristics indicative of corporate status are: (1) associates;
(2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains; (3) con-
tinuity of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) limited liability;
and (6) free transferability of interests.52
The first two characteristics are of no importance analytically be-
cause the IRS does not take into account characteristics such as the
presence of "associates" or an "objective to carry on business and di-
vide the gains,"5 3 which are shared by both corporations and partner-
ships. That leaves four corporate characteristics to be considered.
An organization will be treated as a partnership if it lacks two of the
four remaining corporate characteristics. 54
With respect to the four remaining corporate characteristics, there
is little question that members of a LLC will be held to have limited
liability5s since that is one of the basic elements of this form of busi-
ness organization. There is also little uncertainty about the corporate
characteristic of centralized management. If the LLC is member-
managed, it will be found to lack centralized management, much like
a general partnership.56 On the other hand, if the members choose to
have the LLC operated by a group of managers that includes less
than all the members, or if the LLC is organized under a statute that
requires delegation of authority to managers, 57 then the LLC proba-
50. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1983).
51. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1983).
52. Id.
53. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1983).
54. Id.
55. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361 (finding limited liability regarding a
Wyoming LLC).
56. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1983). The test is whether any person or group
that does not include all of the owners has the exclusive authority to manage the busi-
ness. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(c)(1) (1983).
57. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1991).
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bly will run a greater risk of being found to possess the corporate
characteristic of central management. 58 The principal analytical (and
practical) difficulties involve the remaining two corporate character-
istics: continuity of life and free transferability of interests.
Continuity of life exists when the organization does not dissolve
because one of its owners dies, retires,, resigns, or suffers insanity,
bankruptcy or expulsion.59 Corporations obviously possess this char-
acteristic because a corporation will survive until formal dissolution,
regardless of what may happen to its shareholders. General partner-
ships and limited partnerships, in contrast, are usually thought to
lack continuity of life.60 Unfortunately, no such definitive statement
can be made with respect to LLCs. Much depends on the terms of
the particular state statute under which the LLC is organized.
LLCs organized under the Wyoming, Colorado, Virginia and Ne-
vada statutes probably will be found to lack continuity of life. Under
the dissolution provisions of these statutes,6 ' an LLC dissolves upon
the death, retirement, resignation, bankruptcy or any other event
terminating membership unless, after the event, all remaining mem-
bers agree to continue the business under a right to do so established
in the articles of organization.6 2 In the absence of such unanimous
agreement, the LLC will dissolve, regardless of any contrary provi-
sions in the articles or operating agreement providing for continua-
tion of the entity by the non-dissolving members. 63 Under Revenue
Ruling 88-76, this should be enough to establish a lack of continuity
of life.64
Under the Florida and Kansas statutes, however, unanimous con-
sent to continue the business after an event of dissolution is not nec-
essary if the articles provide the non-dissolving members with a right
to continue the business.65 Florida and Kansas LLCs with articles
creating such a right incur a risk of being defined as possessing con-
tinuity of life.66 The same can be said about Texas LLCs since the
Texas statute permits the articles or regulations to either empower
less than all (indeed, less than a majority) of the members to con-
58. See supra note 52 (finding characteristic of central management in a Wyoming
LLC with designated managers).
59. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1983).
60. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1983).
61. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801 (West Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.320 (Michie Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123 (1977).
62. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361 (noting that Wyoming LLC lacked con-
tinuity of life).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441(c) (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622
(Supp. 1991).
66. See Keatinge, supra note 1, at 425-26.
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tinue the business after an event of dissolution, or eliminate the con-
sent requirement entirely.67 LLCs organized under the Utah statute
incur a similar risk in that Utah's statutory dissolution provisions re-
quire only a majority of members entitled to receive a majority of the
capital to agree to continue the business after an event of
dissolution.68
From a planning perspective, all of these statutes pose problems.
Apparently, the Wyoming, Colorado, Virginia and Nevada statutes
were drafted to ensure that their LLCs would be found to lack con-
tinuity of existence. The cost of that assurance is the planners' in-
ability to draft continuity agreements prior to an event of dissolution;
the survival of the entity thus will depend upon the parties' ability to
achieve a unanimous agreement after such an event. The Florida,
Kansas, Texas and Utah statutes obviously attempt to give the plan-
ner more flexibility, either by making prospective continuity agree-
ments enforceable or by permitting less than all of the members to
agree to continue post-dissolution. The cost, however, is the greater
risk of tax characterization as a corporation.
Similar problems exist with respect to the final corporate charac-
teristic, free transferability of interests. Free transferability exists
when substantially all of the owners have the power to transfer,
without any other owner's consent, all attributes of ownership to a
person not a member of the organization. 69 A right to assign the
member's interest in profits, but not the member's right to partici-
pate in management, does not constitute free transferability.70 A
general partnership, therefore, does not possess free transferability
since a partner can convey only his interest in the profits, not man-
agement rights, without the consent of all the partners.71 The Wyo-
ming statute fits this paradigm nicely by providing that the
transferee of an LLC's member's interest shall not have a right to
participate in management or otherwise become a member unless all
members consent.72 The transferability provisions of the Florida,
Kansas, Colorado, Virginia and Nevada statutes are similar.73
The Utah and Texas statutes, however, depart from this norm, and
67. 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 901 (Vernon) (referring to H.B. 278, § 46, art.
6.01(4)).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-137 (Supp. 1991).
69. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1983).
70. Id.
71. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
72. WYO. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-702 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.432 (West
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their LLCs thus may be found to possess the corporate characteristic
of free transferability of interests. The Utah statute requires only a
majority of members to approve a transfer of interest.7 4 The Texas
statute seems to require unanimous consent, yet allows the members
considerable flexibility to reduce the unanimity requirement.75
LLCs organized under the Utah and Texas statutes may have some
difficulty establishing that they do not possess free transferability of
interests. The drafters' attempt to provide organizers of Utah and
Texas LLCs greater flexibility thus may come to naught. The lack of
flexibility with respect to this issue, however, may not be of great im-
portance because free transferability of interest in closely held enter-
prises is seldom either desirable or, as a practical matter, possible.
III. ARE LLC INTERESTS SECURITIES? THE ANALYTICAL CONTEXT
The foregoing discussion has provided some sense of what LLCs
are and how they work. It also will help answer the question of
whether interests in LLCs are securities. This part sets forth an ana-
lytical context that establishes the basic tests for the existence of a
security and shows how those tests have been applied to similar
forms of business organization.
A. Laundry Lists and Investment Contracts
Providing the proper analytical context is no simple matter. There
is no consensus about the definition of "security."76 The task of de-
fining a security has bedeviled courts for decades. Well-intentioned
academic commentators have not been able to dispel the confusion by
creating ingenious, highly sophisticated redefinitions of "security,"
because those redefinitions have been mostly ignored by the courts
and the legislatures.7 7 The Supreme Court, furthermore, generates
new controversies every time it addresses the issue, with each deci-
Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318(1)
(Michie Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1039, -1040 (Michie Supp. 1991).
74. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 48-2b-131 (Supp. 1991).
75. 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 901 (Vernon) (referring to H.B. 278, § 46, art.
4.07(B)).
76. See William J. Carney & Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's
Struggle with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73, 73 (1981). "One of the notable
intellectual failures of American corporate law has been its inability to deal success-
fully with the problem of defining a security". Id.
77. See, e.g., Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a
More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RESERVE L. REV. 367 (1967); Scott T. Fitzgibbon,
What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Finan-
cial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The
Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis,
33 EMORY L.J. 311 (1984). For suggestions that these proponents of radical redefini-
tions may have had more influence than is suggested in the text, see infra notes 143
and 157 and accompanying text.
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sion on the topic adding more levels of uncertainty rather than less.78
Part of the problem is structural. The Securities Act of 1933 (the
1933 Act),79 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),so and
the Uniform Securities Act (the Uniform Act)81 do not contain sub-
stantive definitions of "security." They contain lists of specific inter-
ests that are considered securities under the acts.8 2 By eschewing a
universal definition of security in favor of these "laundry lists," the
drafters of these acts managed to avoid the conceptual and practical
difficulties of laying down just what a security really is, but they did
so by shifting the definitional burden entirely onto the courts. The
laundry list approach further complicated matters by allowing the
development of separate and often inconsistent patterns of analysis
with respect to key listed items such as notes, stocks, and investment
contracts.
The laundry list approach may be the wisest, since any attempt at
universal definition may prove either over- or under-inclusive and in-
sufficiently responsive to the great variety of market circumstances
where it may be appropriate to recognize the presence of a security.
In addition, the courts have used the term "investment contract" as a
relatively elastic means of establishing the parameters of the "secur-
ity" concept, although they have stopped short of using it to create a
universal definition of security.8 3 The concept of investment contract
78. An example in point is the Court's recent decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young,
494 U.S. 56 (1990), involving the question of whether notes are securities. One com-
mentator was so disturbed by the Court's analysis, which he described as a "stunning
series of non-sequiturs", that he felt compelled to provide an alien's-eye view of the
intellectual chaos within the Court over the definition of security. James D. Gordon,
III, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 TEx. L. REV.
383, 402 (1990).
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77z (1988).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78u (1988).
81. UNIF. SEC. ACT, 7B U.L.A. 509-688 (1985). Thirty-five states have securities
acts modeled on this act. UNIF. SEC. ACT, 7B U.L.A. 124 (Supp. 1991). Five states have
adopted acts based on a 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act. UNIF. SEC. ACT,
7B U.L.A. 57-123 (Supp. 1991) (also known as the "Revised Uniform Securities Act,"
revised 1985).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988); UNIF. SEC. ACT
§ 401(1), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16), 7B U.L.A. 62-63 (Supp.
1991).
83. The Supreme Court made clear that its test for the existence of an investment
contract under SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), is not a universal test for
the definition of security in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985),
when it stated that "the Howey economic reality test was designed to determine
whether a particular instrument is an 'investment contract,' not whether it fits within
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of 'security.'" Id. at 691 (empha-
sis added).
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has served as a means, albeit a partial and imprecise one, of getting to
the essence of a security.
The definition of "investment contract" must be explored in order
to decide whether LLC interests are securities. The outlines of the
definition derived from the Supreme Court's 1946 decision in SEC v.
W. J. Howey Co.8 4 are familiar. An investment contract "means a
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a com-
mon enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
a promoter or third party."8 5 Each of the elements in this definition,
however, has posed severe analytical and policy problems.
For example, must there be an investment of cash in order to meet
the investment of "money" criterion?8 6 Is a "common enterprise"
present when a relationship exists only between the promoter and a
single investor (vertical commonality), or must there be more than
one investor whose investments are somehow pooled (horizontal
commonality)?8 7 What exactly is meant by "profits"?88 All of these
questions have occupied the courts and commentators for decades.8 9
The most vexed question, however, and the one most determinative
84. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
85. Id at 298-99.
86. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the
Supreme Court rejected the argument "that a person's 'investment,' in order to meet
the definition of an investment contract, must take the form of cash only, rather than
of goods and services." Id at 560 n.12. The Court required only that "the purchaser
gave up some tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest that had
substantially the characteristics of a security." Id at 560.
87. The United States Courts of Appeal for the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits
require a showing of horizontal commonality through a pooling of investments. Salcer
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982); Curran
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221-25 (6th Cir. 1980),
affd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457
F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). In contrast, the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits are satisfied with respect to the common enterprise requirement if a
single investor is dependent upon the expertise of a single promoter. Villeneuve v. Ad-
vanced Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983); affd en banc, 730
F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 520-23
(5th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit has created a hybrid approach that does not require
a pooling of investments, but requires the promoter to do more than furnish counsel to
another for a commission. El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th
Cir. 1978). For critical discussion of this issue, see II Louis Loss AND JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 927-935 (3d ed. 1989) (hereinafter Loss & Seligman); James D.
Gordon, III, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory for De-
fining Investment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 635.
88. For example, is there an "expectation of profits" when the investment is pro-
moted as providing tax benefits derived from initial losses? Some courts have said yes.
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prod. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom., Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co. of Nev., 758
F.2d 459, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1985).
89. For citations to the relevant authorities, see Loss & Seligman, supra note 87,
at 920-86.
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of whether LLC interests are securities, is generated by Howey's ap-
parent requirement that the investor's expectation of profits be de-
pendent "solely" on the efforts of others.
The term "solely" has created difficulties because its literal appli-
cation would mean that only purchasers who have remained entirely
passive would be considered to have purchased securities. This would
exclude many situations in which the "economic realities" 90 of the
transaction require even an engaged investor to rely on the en-
trepreneurial or managerial skills of the promoter.
It was in one such situation, involving multi-level distributorship
and pyramid schemes, that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for-
mulated a more flexible test. In its 1973 decision in SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc.,91 the Ninth Circuit stated that the test
should be "whether the efforts made by those other than the investor
are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."92 Eight other
circuits have since adopted this formulation of the "efforts of others"
requirement.9 While the Supreme Court has not yet provided an
unequivocal endorsement of the formulation,94 it is generally re-
garded as "[t]he better view."95
The "efforts of others" criterion, however formulated, has proved
to be the key to the question of whether interests in general partner-
ships and limited partnerships, the forms of business organization
most similar to LLCs,96 should be considered securities. Analysis of
90. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975). The Court
must consider "the substance-the economic realities of the transaction-rather than
the names that may have been employed by the parties." Id.
91. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
92. Id. at 482.
93. See SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v.
Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); SEC v. Aqua-
Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); Kim v.
Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning Group Inc., 669
F.2d 770, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040
n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976);
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
94. In United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975), the Supreme
Court referred to a "reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others," and omitted the use of the word
"solely" altogether. The Court expressly declined to say, however, whether it was
adopting the Glenn W. Turner formulation. Id. at 852 n.16.
95. Loss & Seligman, supra note 87, at 941.
96. This is not to say, of course, that the LLC bears little resemblance to a corpo-
ration. It is only to emphasize that consideration of whether stock in a corporation is a
security does not ordinarily require investment contract analysis, since "stock" is one
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this question will set the stage for consideration of whether LLCs are
securities.
1. Are General Partnership Interests Securities? Williamson v.
Tucker and Its Progeny
As Professors Loss and Seligman have pointed out, the "pivotal cri-
terion for distinguishing partnership or joint venture interests that
are securities from those that are not will be the profits 'solely [or
substantially] from the efforts of others' element in the Howey
test."97 A strong line of authority holds that general partners are not
dependent (solely or substantially) on the efforts of others because
they have the ultimate power under the partnership statute to con-
trol the business.98 Under this analysis, it does not matter whether a
partner has actually exercised managerial power or delegated her au-
thority to others, such as a management or executive committee.
The possession of latent or ultimate control of the partnership is suf-
ficient. This type of control is thought to be possessed by each part-
ner because each general partner is an agent of the partnership.
Notice to one partner is notice to all, and every partner can veto ac-
tions that contravene the partnership agreement.99
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offered an important qualifica-
tion to this reasoning, however, when it emphasized in Williamson v.
Tucker 0 0 that "the mere fact that an investment takes the form of a
of the listed items within the statutory definition of security. For citations to those
definitions, see supra note 82. The key test with respect to stock is whether it pos-
sesses "all of the characteristics... traditionally associated with common stock." Lan-
dreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985). If the stock in question bears
those characteristics, it is a security. If it does not, then investment contract analysis is
appropriate. See Loss & Seligman, supra note 87, at 872-73.
97. Loss & Seligman, supra note 87, at 961 (citations omitted). Note that "joint
ventures" are analyzed in the same terms as partnerships. See, e.g., McGill v. Ameri-
can Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925 (10th Cir. 1985).
98. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 831 (1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215-16 (6th Cir. 1983); Frazier v. Manson,
651 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1981); Slevin v. Pedersen Assocs., 540 F. Supp. 437, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1980), affd, 701 F.2d
176 (6th Cir. 1982); Hirsch v. DuPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd,
553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303,
1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431, 433-34 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
99. See, e.g., Sloan, 394 F. Supp. at 1314, stating:
The fact that a partner may choose to delegate his day-to-day managerial re-
sponsibilities to a committee does not diminish in the least his legal right to a
voice in partnership matters, nor his responsibility under state law for acts of
the partnership .... These factors critically distinguish the status of a gen-
eral partner from that of the purchaser of an investment contract who in law
as well as in fact is a "passive" investor.
Id.
100. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). For additional discus-
sion of Williamson v. Tucker, see Marc H. Morgenstern, Real Estate Joint Venture In-
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general partnership or joint venture does not inevitably insulate it
from the reach of the federal securities laws."101 Even though all
general partners would seem to possess an ultimate power of control
by statute, it still must be determined, as a matter of fact,12 whether
the partner is "dependent on the promoter or manager for the effec-
tive exercise of his partnership powers."103
The court conceded that a partner "who claims his general partner-
ship interest ... is an investment contract has a difficult burden to
overcome."'1 4 The partner must overcome the fact that he possesses
substantial power under the statute by showing that "he was so de-
pendent on the promoter or on a third party that he was in fact un-
able to exercise meaningful partnership powers."105 The court then
offered three examples of how a partner could establish such
dependence:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of
the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as
would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced
and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently
exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is
so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or
otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.1 0 6
The court ultimately found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish
the requisite degree of dependence on others, but it had set new pa-
terests as Securities: The Implications of Williamson v. Tucker, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231
(1982); Leslie J. Levinson, General Partnership Interests and the Securities Act of 1933:
Recent Judicial Developments, 10 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 463 (1983); Comment, General
Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Federal Securities Laws: Substance Over
Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 303 (1985).
101. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422.
102. See Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets
in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1473, 1510-12 (1986)
("the Fifth Circuit concluded that dependence on the efforts of others was a question
of fact").
103. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422. The court pointed out that some of the cases us-
ing the concept of latent partnership control to avoid characterization of general part-
nership interests as securities presumed that the partner in question was not in fact
dependent on someone else for the exercise of his partnership powers. Id.
A few pre-Williamson cases had used a similar analysis to conclude that the general
partnership interests in question were not securities, although not with the clarity and
force found in the Williamson opinion. See, e.g., Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482
F.2d 1093, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 477 (1974); Pawgan v. Silver-
stein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For a pioneer pre-Williamson discussion
of the general partnership question, see Joseph C. Long, Partnership, Limited Part-
nership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV. 581, 612-15 (1972).
104. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court emphasized that this was a non-exclusive list. Id. at 424 n.15.
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rameters for analysis of the question of the securities status of gen-
eral partnership interests.'0 7 Williamson also spawned several
decisions finding general partnership interests to be securities.108
Most cases applying Williamson's analytical framework, however,
have held that the general partnership interests in qudstion should
not be considered securities. 1' 9 This line of cases gives rise to the
suspicion, if not conclusion, that general partnership interests will be
found to be securities only under unusual conditions. The Fourth
Circuit's 1988 decision in Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson
Trawlers, Inc.,110 is an example of the stringent way in which the
courts are analyzing the Williamson exception to the basic presump-
tion about the securities status of general partnership interests.
The Rivanna Trawlers court began its analysis by warning "that
only under limited circumstances can an investor's general partner-
ship interest be characterized as an investment contract" and thus a
security."' The court, in effect, started with a presumption that a
general partnership interest is a security. It then directed examina-
tion of both "the partnership agreement and circumstances of [the]
particular partnership to determine the reality of the contractual
107. Id. at 425.
108. See SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 358.57 (6th Cir. 1984); Westlake
v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Koch v. Hankins,
928 F.2d 1471, 1480 (9th Cir. 1991) (fact question whether partners in 35 affiliated gen-
eral partnerships could exercise control); Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir.
1986) (similar fact question as to ability to exercise control of joint venture).
109. See, e.g., Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1989); Rivanna
Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc. Borchardt, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir.
1988); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831
(1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983); Casablanca Prod., Inc. v. Pace
Int'l Research, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Or. 1988); Power Petroleums v. P & G
Mining Co., 682 F. Supp. 492, 494 (D. Colo. 1988). Note, however, that in Matek v. Mu-
rat, 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit criticized Williamson on fundamen-
tal grounds, describing the second and third factor defined by the Williamson court in
the language quoted above (see text accompanying note 103) as creating "uncertainty
in the area of business investing." Id at 729. The court thus declined to apply those
factors and ruled that the focus should be exclusively on how the partnership agree-
ment allocated authority, rather than on "how in fact the entity functioned in carrying
out its business affairs" and whether the partners actually participated in control. Id.
at 730-31. The Court found authority for that approach in the two pre-Williamson
cases of Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp. 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976), and Schultz
v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1978). A more recent Ninth Circuit deci-
sion, however, seriously undercut the significance of Matek by deciding to apply all
three Williamson factors, and ruled that "'[t]he question of an investor's control over
his investment is decided in terms of practical as well as legal ability to control.'"
Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1478 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d
1449, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989)). Matek thus represents a failed attempt to circumscribe
Williamson's conversion of the control issue into a highly fact-based analysis of both
the agreement and the partners' actual behavior. For discussion of Matek, see Note,
Matek v. Murat: Back to "Terms of Agreement," 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 701 (1989).
110. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
111. Id. at 241.
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rights of the general partners.""12 If, on the basis of that examina-
tion, the court could conclude that the powers allocated to the gen-
eral partners
are specific and unambiguous, and ... [are] sufficient to allow the general
partners to exercise ultimate control, as a majority, over the partnership and
its business, then the presumption that the general partnership is not a secur-
ity can only be rebutted by evidence that it is not possible for the partners to
exercise those powers. 1 1 3
The message here seems fairly clear. So long as the partnership
agreement (with a sufficient degree of specificity) leaves at least a
majority of the partners with "ultimate control," then the general
partnership interests will not be considered securities, unless it can
be shown that it was "not possible" for the partners to exercise their
powers.114 In this case, the court found that the partnership agree-
ment gave the partners "the authority to manage their invest-
ments,"l"5 and that they were capable of and did in fact exercise that
authority."16
The conclusion that can be drawn from Rivanna Trawlers and,
more generally, Williamson and its progeny, is that analysis of the
efforts of others criterion requires consideration of the general part-
ners' statutory control rights, contractual rights and actual behavior.
Even if a partner does not participate in management, the retention
of ultimate control, particularly under a specific general partnership
agreement, will preclude the finding of a security, unless a very clear
legal or practical inability to exercise that control can be shown. In
short, general partnership interests will be treated as securities only
in anomalous situations. This conclusion--and this pattern of analy-
sis-should be kept in mind when examining LLCs.
2. Are Limited Partnership Interests Securities? Public
Offerings and Half-Interests in Hamburger Stands
As seen above, general partnership interests usually are not consid-
ered investment contracts because general partners ordinarily retain
112. 1&i Interestingly, the court emphasized the importance of the partners' con-
tractual rights rather than statutory rights to participate in control, probably because
the statutory rights can be modified by contract. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(e), 6
U.L.A. 213 (1969) (providing that "[a]ll partners have equal rights in the management
and conduct of the partnership business," subject to any agreement between them).
113. Rivanna Dawlers, 840 F.2d at 241 (emphasis added).
114. Id,
115. Id, at 242.
116. Id This analysis is consistent with that applied by the Ninth Circuit in Koch
v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991). See also supra note 109.
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ultimate control. General partnership interests may become invest-
ment contracts only when the partners are incapable of exercising
that control. These premises allow substantial delegation of general
partners' managerial authority without causing them to be regarded
as depending on the efforts of others under Howey.
Limited partnership interests, in contrast, are considered invest-
ment contracts because a limited partner who exercises too much
control loses limited liability for the obligations of the limited part-
nership.117 A limited partner, by virtue of this basic premise of lim-
ited partnership law, must be dependent on the efforts of others to
generate profits from the enterprise. As a result, limited partnership
interests are ordinarily considered securities," 8 despite the fact that
limited partners have some participatory rights under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act 1 9 and extensive participatory rights under
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.1 2 0
117. ULPA § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969); RULPA § 303, 6 U.L.A. 325-26 (Supp. 1991).
118. See Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983); SEC v. Holschuh,
694 F.2d 130, 137 (7th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1980);
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979); Hirsch v. DuPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 'ffd, 553 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1977).
119. ULPA § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969), provides no express safe harbor defining the
limited partners' participatory rights, but ULPA §§ 10(a)-(b), 6 U.L.A. 590 (1969), gives
the limited partners an inspection right and a right to demand an accounting. Some
courts, furthermore, have been sympathetic to limited partners who have reserved
rights of participation in control, but have not exercised them. See Plasteel Prod.
Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959); Rathke v. Griffith, 218 P.2d 757 (Wash.
1950). Other courts have permitted limited partners, in effect, to participate in control
of the limited partnership by controlling the partnership's corporate general partner as
a shareholder officer or director. See, e.g., Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties,
Inc., 544 P.2d 781 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd, 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977) (no liability
under state version of section 7); but see Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543
(Tex. 1973) (court reached opposite conclusion in similar situation).
120. RULPA § 303(b), 6 U.L.A. 325-26 (Supp. 1991), provides considerably more lee-
way by listing a series of activities with the preface that a "limited partner does not
participate in control of the business... solely by doing one or more of the following."
This non-exclusive list of activities includes "being an officer, director or shareholder
of a general partner that is a corporation," bringing a derivative action on behalf of the
limited partnership, and voting on a broad variety of matters. Furthermore, the 1985
amendments to section 303, provide in RULPA § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 325 (Supp. 1991), that
a limited partner who participates in control of the business "is liable only to persons
who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon
the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner."
This increase under RULPA in the ability of the limited partners to participate in
control seems to suggest that the usual presumption that limited partnership interests
are securities should be reversed. So far this does not seem to have occurred, probably
because there is still a residual risk under section 303 that a limited partner who goes
too far in exercising control will lose limited liability status. See, Loss & Seligman,
supra note 87, at 961-63 n.211. Note, however, that the Georgia Revised Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act goes further than RULPA by stating unequivocally that a "lim-
ited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership by reason of being
a limited partner and does not become so by participating in the management or con-
trol of the business." GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-303 (190). Can Georgia limited partner-
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There are a few cases, however, that pose a narrow and somewhat
ill-defined qualification to this line of reasoning. These cases suggest
that a limited partnership interest may not be an investment contract
if: (1) the limited partners in fact exercise substantial control over
the limited partnership; and (2) there are only a small number of
limited partners. The reason for the significance of these factors re-
quires some explanation.
The significance of the exercise of control should be obvious since
it undercuts the presumption that limited partners cannot exercise
control. In Darrah v. Garrett,121 for example, the court found that
the limited partners exercised control of the limited partnership by
virtue of their control over an affiliated corporation, which used the
limited partnership as "a mere mechanism or conduit for transferring
corporate profits."122 In Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates,123 the court emphasized
that the limited partnership agreement gave the limited partners the
right to approve the disposal or encumbrance of partnership prop-
erty, the appointment or removal of a manager, and the admission of
additional general partners. 124 The court in Bamco 18 v. Reeves 125
contented itself with finding that the limited partner "had a say...
in the operation"'126 of a partnership asset and "some control over the
subject of its investment."127
Unfortunately, the opinions in these cases do not clearly illustrate
much control is too much from the Howey perspective. In particular,
they do not establish how great the departure from the level of con-
trol permitted to limited partners under state partnership law must
be before the basic presumption about a limited partner's inherent
dependence on the efforts of others will be overcome.
This uncertainty about the control factor suggests that the second
factor may be more important. In Bamco 18 the court supported its
characterization of the limited partnership interests by emphasizing
that "there was no public offering of limited partnership interests
ship interests no longer be presumed to be securities? Is a case-by-case determination
required?
121. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,472 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
122. Id. at 98,364.
123. 595 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
124. Id. at 806.
125. 675 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
126. Id. at 830.
127. Id.
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and that the sale of the interest was the result of negotiations." 28
Similarly, in Hotel Rittenhouse, the court found that "the transaction
in question [was] distinguishable from . . . large-scale investment
schemes."12 9 In both cases, the courts distinguished the cases at
hand, in each of which there was only one limited partner, 30 from
Mayer v. Oil Field Systems Corp.,131 a leading case holding limited
partnership interests to be securities. In Mayer, Judge Friendly of
the Second Circuit justified his characterization of limited partner-
ship interests as securities not only by reference to the limited part-
ners' lack of a "managerial role,"132 but by virtue of the
"considerable number of limited partners" 3 3 in the partnership at
hand. Both the Bamco 18 and the Hotel Rittenhouse courts, further-
more, relied on language from Professor Loss, who defined the prob-
lem as one of being able "to distinguish between the public offering
of securities parading as 'limited partnership interests' and 'an offer-
ing of a half interest in a hamburger stand.' "'34
These arguments tap into a line of reasoning of increasing impor-
tance in the way the Supreme Court thinks about the definition of a
security. While the Bamco 18 and Hotel Rittenhouse courts do not
cite the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver 35
in support of their emphasis on the small number of limited partners,
they very well could have found some support in that case.
In Marine Bank, a lender had agreed to receive fifty percent of a
borrower company's profits until the loan was repaid. The agree-
ment also gave the lender the power to veto any future borrowing by
the company. 38 In deciding that this agreement was not an invest-
ment contract, the Court emphasized, inter alia, that the investment
contracts found in its earlier decisions had market characteristics dif-
ferent from the instant agreement's characteristics.
The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior cases involved
offers to a number of potential investors, not a private transaction as in this
case. In Howeij, for example, 42 persons purchased interests in a citrus grove
during a 4-month period .... In CM. Joiner Leasing, offers to sell oil leases
were sent to over 1,000 prospects .... In CM. Joiner Leasing, we noted that a
128. 1& at 831.
129. Hotel Rittenhouse, 595 F. Supp. at 807.
130. Bamco 18, 675 F. Supp. at 830; Hotel Rittenhouse, 595 F. Supp. at 807.
131. 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983).
132. I& at 65.
133. 1I
134. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 198-99 (1983) (cited in
Bamco 18 675 F. Supp. at 830, and Hotel Rittenhouse, 595 F. Supp. at 806). The full
quotation is as follows: "The problem, as Judge Frank put it when he was Chairman
of the SEC, is to distinguish between the public offering of securities parading as 'lim-
ited partnership interests' and 'an offering of a half interest in a hamburger stand."'
Id See also Loss & Seligman, supra note 87, at 960 (same language).
135. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
136. Id at 553.
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security is an instrument in which there is "common trading".... The instru-
ments involved in CM Joiner Leasing and Howey had equivalent values to
most persons and could have been traded publicly.
13 7
There is much confusion about this set of assumptions, since it is
somewhat at odds with the Court's own statement, earlier in the
same opinion, that "the coverage of the antifraud provisions of the se-
curities laws is not limited to instruments traded at securities ex-
changes and over-the-counter markets, but extends to uncommon
and irregular instruments. ' 138 In addition, its apparent characteriza-
tion of private transactions as non-securities transactions would seem
to render nugatory the non-public offering exemption under the 1933
Act.139 It is also not clear whether the Court was merely trying to
apply the horizontal commonality version of the common enterprise
test, or whether it was trying to do* something more. In any event,
the thrust of the Court's reasoning in Marine Bank seems consistent
with that of the courts in Bamco 18 and Hotel Rittenhouse.
A more recent Supreme Court decision suggests that the Court
continues to regard the presence of some kind of public distribution
or the potential for "common trading" to be essential to the existence
of a security. In Reves v. Ernst & Young,140 the Court found the fact
that certain notes were "offered and sold to a broad segment of the
public,"'141 to be one of the key factors in determining that the notes
were securities. The theoretical basis and relative importance of this
factor are by no means clear, 142 and the Court has not begun to draw
the dividing line between public and private for purposes of the defi-
nition of security.143 It does seem, however, that the Court is main-
taining a distinction that may allow some limited partnership
137. Id. at 559-60.
138. Id. at 556.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988). For critical discussion of Marine Bank, see Marc I.
Steinberg and William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Secur-
ity" The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications,
40 VAND. L. REV. 489 (1987). For a more positive evaluation, see Karjala, supra note
102, at 1510.
140. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
141. Id. at 68.
142. For a critical discussion of the Court's basic conceptual confusion with respect
to this factor, see Gordon, supra note 78, at 392-93, 395, 397. For a thorough analysis of
the pose-Reves confusion in the lower courts over these concepts, see Janet Kerr and
Karen Eisenhauer, Reves Revisited, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1123 (1992).
143. For more sophisticated attempts to tie the definition of "security" to market
characteristics and the proper allocation of federal and state regulatory responsibili-
ties, see Karjala, supra note 102, at 1508-15; see also Fitzgibbon, supra note 77. The
Marine Bank and Reves decisions suggest that these proponents of market-based defi-
nitions of securities may yet have their day.
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interests to avoid securities status.144 This distinction also may have
a bearing on the securities status of LLC interests.
B. The Risk Capital Alternative
Before applying the Howey analysis to limited liability company in-
terests, it is useful to spend some time considering an alternative
form of analysis-the so-called "risk capital" test. Despite little ac-
ceptance in the federal courts,145 a lack of uniformity in its formula-
tion, and some basic uncertainties in its meaning,146 the risk capital
test is applied in several states (most notably California) as a means
of determining the existence of a security.147 A persistent conceptual
incoherence may mean that risk capital is "more of a label than a
test,"'148 but its importance at the state level justifies at least a brief
summary of this approach to the definition of security.
The first point to note about the risk capital test is that there is no
single risk capital test. There are different versions in different
states. Some take the form of statutory definitions, 149 others were
established in case law,150 and others are largely the creation of ad-
ministrative decisions.151 In some jurisdictions the risk capital test is
used as a means of defining "investment contract" as an alternative
to Howey;152 in others it is an independent means of defining
144. It would seem, however, that the limited partners will also have to control the
partnership to some degree; the mere lack of potential for common trading may not be
enough to reverse the usual presumption.
145. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 483 n.10 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (refusing to apply risk capital analysis).
146. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. For additional critical discus-
sion, see Carney & Fraser, supra note 76, at 96-118.
147. For a survey of state applications of the risk capital concept, see 1 JOSEPH C.
LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 2.04[3] (1990) [hereinafter LONG].
148. JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN AND DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 155 (1991) [hereinafter Cox, Hillman & Langevoort].
149. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(r)(16) (West Supp. 1992), (defining a se-
curity as including an "investment of money or money's worth including goods fur-
nished and/or services performed in the risk capital of a venture with the expectation
of some benefit to the investor where the investor has no direct control over the in-
vestment or policy decisions of the venture").
150. See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d 680, (Cal. 1986); Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, (Cal. 1961); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business
Systems, Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Or. Ct. App. 1971).
151. See, e.g., Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. No. 66-284 (June 2, 1967), [1961-71 Transfer
Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 70,747 (applying a risk capital analysis and holding
that sale of a franchise could be sale of a security); Okla. Sec. Comm'n Interpretive
Op., 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) $ 46,641 (July 3, 1980) (applying Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. No.
66-284 and a risk capital analysis). California securities regulators also apply a type of
risk capital analysis to the question of whether real estate timesharing interests are
securities. See Cal. Corp. Comm'r Interpretive Op. 78-30 (Apr. 24, 1978).
152. This seems to be the approach in California. See People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d
680 (Cal. 1986).
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security.I5 3
Perhaps the most coherent version of the risk capital test was ar-
ticulated by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1971 in State v. Hawaii
Market Center, Inc.154 This version of the test has also been applied
by courts in several other jurisdictions155 and adopted by statute in
six others.156 The Hawaii Market Center test, which was based on an
original formulation by Professor Coffey, 5 7 provides that:
[A]n investment contract is created whenever
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) [A] portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enter-
prise, and
(3) [T~he furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will ac-
crue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) [T]he offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise. 1 5 8
Much of this approach is similar to the the Howey test. The first
criterion is generally regarded as equivalent to the Howey investment
of money requirement.'5 9 The fourth criterion is similar to the lib-
eralized Glenn W. Turner version of the Howey efforts of others re-
quirement.160 Other components, in contrast, are more novel.
The third criterion of a promise or representation of benefit, for
example, reflects the risk capital test's origin in cases involving
clubs161 or founder-membership schemes 6 2 in which the investors
153. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(r)(11), (16) (West Supp. 1992) (which
lists "investment contract" and items which satisfy the risk capital definition quoted in
supra note 146 as separate types of securities.).
154. 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971).
155. See, e.g., Securities Admin. v. College Assistance Plan, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 118
(D. Guam 1981), ,ffd, 700 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983); Casali v. Schultz, 732 S.W.2d 836
(Ark. 1987); State v. George, 362 N.E.2d 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
156. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(16) (Michie 1981);
MICH. Comp. LAws § 451.80(1) (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(12) (1985); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(P) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.02.005(12) (1988).
157. Coffey, supra note 77, at 377. Professor Coffey's formulation has been the
most successful of the academic attempts at redefinition in terms of acceptance by the
courts and state legislatures.
158. Hawaii Mkt Center, 485 P.2d at 109.
159. See LONG, supra note 147, at § 2.04[4] (stating that "[i]tem 1 of this test is noth-
ing more than the investment concept of the Howey test").
160. See supra note 91-95 and accompanying text.
161. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, (Cal. 1961) (member-
ships in country clubs); 1973 Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 38, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) $ 71,213 (March 5, 1973) (memberships in campsite).
162. These schemes allow "founders" to get in on the ground floor of a "distributor-
ship" program, and then earn commissions by recruiting additional members. Most of
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received benefits (such as the use of club facilities) that could not be
strictly defined as profits in Howey terms. The second criterion is
even more idiosyncratic and perhaps most expressive of the essence
of the overall test-the requirement that the investors have contrib-
uted capital "subjected to the risks of the enterprise," or risk
capital.163
This second criterion is not only novel, but somewhat mysterious.
The first and fourth criteria really raise no new issues distinctive
from those raised by Howey's efforts of others and investment of
money requirements. The benefits/profits distinction reflects a de-
parture from Howey, but its meaning is not all that elusive, and it is
of importance only in those exceptional cases in which profits in the
narrow sense are not expected. The meaning of "risk capital" under
the second part of the Hawaii Market Center test and other versions
of the risk capital test, in contrast, is quite elusive.164
For example, risk capital is sometimes thought to mean capital that
is subject to a high or an excessive degree of risk.165 Some courts
have held that the lack of such "riskiness" precludes the finding of a
security.166 Alternatively, risk capital is sometimes regarded to mean
the initial capitalization of the issuers is distinct from additional capi-
tal sought by an operating company that has already gone through
one or more rounds of financing. The second criterion of the Hawaii
Market Center test, for example, speaks in terms of "initial value",
causing some courts to use the term risk capital exclusively in the
sense of initial capitalization.167 Others, however, have expressly re-
these programs are essentially pyramid schemes in which the contributions of subse-
quent participants are used to provide a return to the initial investors. The pyramid
collapses when there are no longer enough new participants to pay those who have al-
ready bought in to the scheme. For an example, see State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485
P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971).
163. Professor Long has offered a simplified version of this test that retains most of
the basic elements just outlined in the text: "(1) an investment, (2) in the risk capital
of an enterprise, and (3) the expectation of a benefit." LONG, supra note 147, at
§ 2.04[3]. It is unclear whether Professor Long would include an "efforts of others" el-
ement. Without such an element, this would be a far broader definition of risk capital
than under the Hawaii Market Center test.
164. See LONG, supra note 147, at § 2.04[3].
165. For a discussion of this interpretation, see LONG, supra note 147, at § 2.04[3];
Cox, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 148, at 151.
166. See, e.g., Moreland v. Department of Corp., 239 Cal. Rptr. 558 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (a transaction satisfying either Howey or the risk capital test is classified as a
security); Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corp., 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974); cf. People v. Wind River Mining Project, 269 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(greater quantum of risk means that purchasers are investing risk capital).
167. See, e.g., State ex reL Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 555
(Or. Ct. App. 1971) (expressing concern about "whether the franchiser is dependent
upon the franchisees' capital to initiate his operations, not just [to] manufacture his
product."); In re Jet Set Travel Club, [1971-78 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 71,175, at 67,649 (Or. Corp. Comm'n 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 P.2d
109 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (no risk capital when the firm had already begun operations).
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jected this limitation on the term.16s
The exact meaning of the central term "risk capital" thus remains
unclear, which is probably the reason why the test has had only very
limited acceptance. It does, however, pose an interesting alternative
to Howey, despite some similarities between the tests. First, it is in
one sense a liberalized version of Howey, because it employs the
more flexible version of the efforts of others requirement and it does
not require horizontal commonality.16 9 There also seems to be no
trace of the public distribution or potential for common trading re-
quirement that has emerged under Marine Bank and Reves.170 Sec-
ond, and more importantly, it allows (albeit in a confused way)
consideration of the degree of risk incurred by the purchaser as an
element of the definition of security. 171 These distinctions should be
taken into account when considering whether LLC interests are se-
curities under the risk capital test.
IV. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INTERESTS (PROBABLY) ARE NOT
SECURITIES
For purposes of the federal securities laws, the narrow question is
whether LLC interests are investment contracts. While LLCs pos-
sess certain corporate-like characteristics,172 they are not corpora-
tions. They thus do not issue stock, which is one of the instruments
listed in the statutory definition of a security.173 If they did, the
168. See, e.g., State ex teL Park v. Glenn Turner Enter., Inc., [1971-78 Transfer
Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,023, at 67,201 (D. Idaho 1972) (commenting that
"[t]he unwary and gullible investor can be fleeced much more readily by the older
more affluent company which has been long in business").
169. Some commentators have gone so far as to say that the risk capital test even
eliminates the need for vertical commonality, requiring only a transfer of value from
the investor to the promoter, and no linking of destinies. See Carney & Fraser, supra
note 76, at 111-13.
170. See supra notes 128-144 and accompanying text.
171. Note that there is a subtext in the Supreme Court investment contract deci-
sions with respect to the matter of risk. In United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975), the Court noted that purchasers of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative
corporation "take no risk in any significant sense." Id. at 857 n.24. In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the Court distinguished be-
tween the risk of investing in a pension plan and the risk of investing in securities. Id,
at 562. The association of the element of risk with the definition of investment con-
tracts under Howey has been very tentative, and no coherent analysis along these lines
has yet emerged. For a critical discussion of this issue, see Carney & Fraser, supra
note 76, at 106-08 (noting that the Court's "analysis of the source of the risk... is irrel-
evant to questions of whether the investment is at risk").
172. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 82 for citations to the statutory definitions of "security."
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question would be whether their "stock" possessed the common char-
acteristics of stock, and not whether it constituted an investment con-
tract.' 74 Because LLCs do not issue stock, or any of the other
instruments included on the statutory laundry list, interests in them
(like those in general partnerships and limited partnerships) must be
investment contracts in order to be securities. This Part will begin
with an analysis of whether LLC interests are investment contracts
under the Howey test. It will then conclude with a separate analysis
of these interests' securities status under the risk capital concept.
A. LLC Interests Under Howey: Control and Common Trading
LLC interests would ordinarily meet most aspects of the Howey
test without posing substantial difficulties. LLC members typically
invest money in exchange for their interests, and thus do not produce
the kinds of uncertainties associated with more unorthodox forms of
investment. 75 They also usually invest in a common enterprise in
which the participants' pooled funds are subject to a common fate.
This pooling probably meets the more rigorous horizontal commonal-
ity version of the common enterprise requirement. LLCs typically
would not be structured in the form of a vertical promoter/single in-
vestor relationship; they are likely to be structured around the joint
contributions of two or more members in a "horizontal" partnership-
like relation.176 Furthermore, LLC members ordinarily will be ex-
pecting profits, and not some unconventional form of benefit. 77
As with general partnerships and limited partnerships, the central
question is whether LLC members rely on the efforts of others.
With respect to general and limited partnerships, Part II showed ba-
sically two opposing presumptions. First, general partnership inter-
ests are virtually presumed not to be securities because general
partners retain ultimate control over the enterprise by means of
their statutory authority as general partners. This presumption
seems to operate even if the partners have delegated substantial
managerial authority or have otherwise not participated in control of
the enterprise. The principal, if not the only, way to overcome this
presumption is to show that the partners had no legal or practical
174. See supra note 83.
175. See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
177. Since an LLC is a pass-through vehicle, LLC members may sometimes be hop-
ing to take advantage of the pass-through of losses for tax purposes. The expectation
of tax losses, however, has been held to satisfy the expectation of profits requirement
in other contexts. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prod. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir.) (licensing
to sell product), cert. denied sub nom., Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); Kolibash v.
Sagittarius Recording Co., 626 F. Supp. 1173, 1178 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (a "recording lease
program.")
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ability to exercise their rights of control.178
On the other hand, limited partnership interests are presumed to
be securities because state limited partnership law precludes limited
partners from exercising control. Limited partners are thus pre-
sumed to be dependent on the efforts of others.' 79 This presumption
is very strong. The authorization of much greater limited partner
participation under RULPA has not disturbed this view.'8 0 Only a
very few cases have found the extraordinary degree of limited part-
ner control, combined with a lack of potential for common trading,
that would overcome the presumption.' 8 '
Where do LLCs interests fall between these polarities? To what
extent is either presumption applicable to LLCs?
LLCs are probably least analogous to limited partnerships for pur-
poses of these questions. One of the structural advantages of LLCs
over limited partnerships is that LLC members can achieve the tax
benefits of the entity's pass-through status without risking their lim-
ited liability by participating in control. 82 The lack of a state law
prohibition (or at least restriction) on participation in control of the
LLC means that there can be no limited partnership-like presump-
tion that LLC members are dependent on the efforts of others. LLC
interests hence are not presumptively investment contracts for the'
reason that limited partnership interests are. 8 3
The analogy to general partnerships is much closer. In order to
avoid characterizing their LLCs as possessing centralized manage-
ment for tax purposes, most LLC statutes provide that the members
will manage the LLCs, unless the articles of organization provide
otherwise. 8 4 The Uniform Partnership Act provides similarly.185
Furthermore, the tax risk associated with delegating authority to
178. See supra notes 100-116 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 120.
181. See supra notes 121-144 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
184. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1991) (management "in proportion to
... contributions to the capital"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1991); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 86.312 (Michie Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (Supp. 1991)
(management "in proportion to ... interests in the profits"); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1022 (Michie Supp. 1991) (allowing for delegation of managerial authority in the oper-
ating agreement); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977). In contrast, the Colorado statute re-
quires the LLC to be controlled by managers. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401 (Supp.
1990). The members, however, may also be the managers. See Comment, Limited Lia-
bility Companies, 39 KAN. L. REV. 967, 978-80 (1991). The Texas statute takes an inter-
mediate position by providing that the LLC will be managed by managers unless the
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managers creates an incentive for member-management. LLC mem-
bers also have the authority to elect and remove managers in man-
ager-managed LLCs.186 If there are no managers, LLC members
have the authority to bind the partnership.I8 7 LLCs and general
partnerships both seem to be entities in which member/partner par-
ticipation in control seems to be the essence of the relationship.
This is not to say, however, that control rights may not be allocated
in many different ways in both settings. An LLC operating agree-
ment, much like a general partnership agreement, can delegate sub-
stantial authority to managers. It can take a middle position and
divide day-to-day management responsibilities and residual powers of
approval, election, or removal between members and managers. Al-
ternatively, it can simply implement straight-out member manage-
ment. The LLC statutes, much like the Uniform Partnership Act,
thus contemplate (and purposefully permit) a wide spectrum of de-
grees of participation in control by LLC members. Since these varia-
tions in degree of participation by general partners do not ordinarily
overcome-the presumption that they are relying on their own efforts
to generate a profit, 88 a similar presumption should arise with re-
spect to LLC interests. This presumption should be overcome only
when a Williamson-type analysis shows that a member is so unso-
phisticated, inexperienced, inexpert, uninformed, or dominated by
the managers that he is incapable of exercising his authority and is
wholly dependent on the manager. Further, the presumption might
be overcome by showing that the deferral of authority to the man-
ager in the operating agreement is so massive that the members have
essentially no control rights (including residual rights to remove the
manager or amend the articles of organization).189
regulations provide otherwise. 1991 Tex. Sss. Law Serv. 901 (Vernon) (referring to
H.B. 278, § 46, art. 2.12).
185. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
186. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977) (providing for annual election of man-
agers); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-405 (Supp. 1990) (providing for removal of managers
with or without cause).
187. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (Supp. 1991). The implicit limitation on
the members' authority when the LLC is operated by managers is not all that different
from the limitation on the authority of general partners who have delegated their au-
thority to an executive or management committee, except that general partners are ar-
guably surrounded by a larger penumbra of apparent authority. See UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1)-(2), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969).
188. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
189. These conclusions probably would apply to Colorado LLCs as well, even
though those entities are required to have managers. LLC members retain certain
powers under the statute, such as the right to vote annually on the election of manag-
ers, the right to unanimously approve transfers of other members' interests, and, if
granted in the articles, the right to unanimously consent to the continuation of the
LLC upon dissolution. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-204(1), -401(1), -402(2), -702(1), -801(c)
(Supp. 1990). The operating agreement may also give the members additional voting
rights. For further discussion, see John R. Maxfield, et al., Colorado Enacts Limited
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This conclusion can be supported by the line of reasoning in
Marine Bank, Reves, and some of the limited partnership cases re-
garding whether the interests in question have been publicly distrib-
uted or are subject to common trading.190 As previously noted,191 the
rationale used in these cases is still somewhat incoherent, but it dem-
onstrates a tendency not to find securities in transactions that have
been privately negotiated and those involving interests for which
there is little if any secondary market. That tendency should rein-
force the characterization of LLC interests as non-securities, at least
so long as the interests are not marketed publicly.
In the absence of extreme circumstances, the presumption that
LLC interests are not investment contracts should stand. It should
stand even if one takes the position that a manager-managed LLC,
with a governing group somewhat like a board of directors, several
classes of ownership interests, articles of organization filed in a state
office (i.e., virtual "incorporation"), a high degree of continuity of
life, and only residual authority in the members, has the "look and
feel" of a close corporation. All that seems to be missing from this
picture is stock. The argument thus could be made that such LLC
interests are closely analogous to stock in a close corporation and,
hence should be treated as securities since stock in a close corpora-
tion is universally regarded as a security.
This argument starts off with the wrong assumptions. Stock in a
close corporation is a security, technically, because stock is listed as
such within the statutory definitions of "security." The inclusion of
stock within these statutory laundry lists does not mean, however,
that it makes sense to treat that form of ownership interest in a
closely-held enterprise as a security subject to the coverage of the se-
curities laws. The law tends to treat all stock (or at least stock bear-
ing the common characteristics of stock) as a security, largely
because it would be wasteful to try to determine on a case-by-case ba-
sis whether stock is a security, as the Supreme Court recognized
Liability Corporation Legislation, 19 COL. LAW. 1029, 1030-31 (1990). Furthermore, as
mentioned in the text, nothing prevents the members from being the managers and
thereby rendering the member/manager distinction largely trivial. In short, Colorado
LLC members possess substantial residual authority under the statute and may pos-
sess even greater authority under the operating agreement or because the managers
and members are identical. Hence, the presumption that LLC members are not rely-
ing on the efforts of others may not apply with as much force to Colorado LLC inter-
ests, but the ultimate outcome of the Howey analysis is likely to be the same.
190. See supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
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when it rejected the sale of business doctrine.192 Such case-by-case
determinations would probably be too upsetting to the commonsense
expectation that this very familiar form of instrument should always
be treated as a security, and would probably inject too much uncer-
tainty into routine transactions.
Only such powerful considerations should be permitted to over-
come what should be the basic presumption-that ownership inter-
ests in closely-held enterprises (whatever their form of organization)
should not be treated as securities.193 The private, informal and rela-
tively equal relations among owners of these entities (whether called
partners, shareholders or members), which take place outside the
context of public securities markets, should be governed by the com-
mon law of fraud, fiduciary duty, and contract. We thus should not
assume that LLC interests will be considered securities because they
are analogous to stock in a close corporation. We should recognize,
instead, that the status of close corporation stock as a security is an
anomaly that can be justified, if at all, only by profound considera-
tions of convenience and historical expectations. The analogy of LLC
interests to corporate stock hence should not enhance the risk of
securitization of LLC interests, but rather should call into question
the theoretical underpinnings of the traditional assumption that
stock in a close corporation is a security.
The fact that LLC members, unlike general partners, possess lim-
ited liability is not inconsistent with this conclusion. It has been ar-
gued that the "critical difference between LLCs and general
partnerships is that partners' personal liability necessarily provides
incentives to be highly informed about the business. At the same
time, personal liability discourages involvement by unsophisticated
investors. It follows that LLCs may have greater securities law
192. The Supreme Court rejected this doctrine in Landreth Timber Co. v. Lan-
dreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). The sale of business doctrine expressed the sentiment that
application of the federal securities law to private, arms-length transactions that hap-
pened to involve the sale of stock (as distinct from the sale of assets) did not make
sense. The Court refused to take this consideration into account when determining
whether interests that possess the common characteristics of stock should always be
treated as a security, largely because of the concerns about predictability and the his-
torical expectations described above. Id. at 695-97. In Justice Stevens' forceful dissent,
he stated that he
would hold that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws are in-
applicable unless the transaction involves (i) the sale of a security that is
traded in a public market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to negoti-
ate appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on access to inside infor-
mation before consummating the transaction.
Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. For a very recent discussion that reaches a similar conclusion, see Larry E.
Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 22-24
(1992).
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exposure than partnerships. '"1 94 This is a highly formalistic distinc-
tion between the incentives of investors in general partnerships and
investors in limited liability vehicles such as corporations and LLCs,
particularly when those investors are all investing in closely-held en-
terprises. As a practical matter, investors in such enterprises-
whatever the form of business organization--all have substantial in-
centives to be highly informed about the business, because their in-
vestment is likely to represent a large percentage of their personal
wealth, their position is illiquid because there is no real secondary
market for their interests, and because they have often personally
guaranteed the business' obligations. It is also by no means clear that
the general partnership's lack of limited liability either encourages or
discourages "unsophisticated investors." Many unsophisticated inves-
tors are attracted to the general partnership form because of its rela-
tive simplicity. This purported distinction between the incentives of
general partners and LLC members thus has little bearing on the
question of whether LLC members are more or less dependent on
the efforts of others and does not undermine the basic conclusion:
LLC interests are not ordinarily investment contracts under the
Howey test.
B. The Risk Capital Test: Control and Risk
The first basic question that arises under the risk capital analysis
with respect to LLCs is the same question that arises under the-
Howey test: are LLC members dependent upon the efforts of others?
An equivalent of the liberalized version of the Howey efforts of
others requirement is built into the fourth element of the Hawaii
Market Center definition,195 as well as into its several statutory incar-
nations196 and other statutory risk capital definitions. 197 To the ex-
tent that a risk capital test requires an investor to rely on the efforts
of others, the analysis of the allocation of control in LLCs outlined
above198 will apply. The liberalized version of this criterion under
Hawaii Market Center and its progeny might effect the outcome of
that analysis marginally, but the issues are the same. Furthermore,
there would be no need to answer the question of whether the LLC
members have invested "risk capital," if it were found that they were
194. Keatinge, supra note 1, at 403-04.
195. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 153.
197. See supra note 146.
198. See supra notes 178-192 and accompanying text.
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relying on their own efforts to generate profits, and not those of
others. That finding would end the inquiry.
If, on the other hand, it were found that the members are relying
on the efforts of others, then the nature of their investment would
have to be determined. Has there been an investment of "risk capi-
tal" as that term is understood in the governing jurisdiction? If the
operative definition associates risk capital with "riskiness," 99 then
an LLC interest might be found to be risk capital since this form of
equity investment is not likely to be collateralized or otherwise at-
tached to a security interest.200 Investment in an operating enter-
prise without any fixed rate of return, promoter's guarantee, or
priority against creditors would also contribute to the impression of
riskiness. Predicting the requisite degree of riskiness, however, is it-
self fairly risky, causing substantial uncertainty to surround this
means of defining risk capital.
Investment in LLC interests will also take the form of a contribu-
tion of initial capital if the investment is made at the time the LLC is
formed. This may make a difference in some jurisdictions.201 More
broadly, it may simply be found that the LLC investment is subject
to the risks of the enterprise; such risk may be enough to character-
ize it as risk capital under the term's most expansive definitions.202
Whether risk capital is defined more or less expansively, there is a
good chance that investment in an LLC interest would be character-
ized as "risk capital." This would nevertheless not compel the con-
clusion that the LLC interest is a security, unless it were also found
that the LLC members are dependent on efforts of others under the
fourth element of the Hawaii Market Center test or its equivalent.
In light of the primacy of this issue under the Howey test, there is
probably not a greater chance that LLCs interests will be found to be
securities in risk capital jurisdictions than under Howey.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion that LLC interests are not securities under most
circumstances should come as good news to business planners. If
these interests are not securities, then their offer and sale will not
generate the transactional costs of determining the availability of an
exemption from federal and state securities registration and perform-
ing the due diligence needed to establish such exemptions. In addi-
tion, issuers that forgot about securities law compliance before they
199. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
200. Cf. supra note 166.
201. See supra note 168.
202. This seems to be Professor Long's view of the concept. See LONG, supra note
147, at 2-136 to -137.
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sold the interests will not need to worry about having given the in-
vestors an option to rescind their investment if the deal goes sour.
Questions of fraud, furthermore, will be fought out under the com-
mon law in the state courts, where they belong, rather than in the
federal courts.
The non-securities status of LLC interests presents a planning ad-
vantage that may not be as critical as the LLC's pass-through status
for tax purposes, but is still very important. It is also very simple. If
the owners of a closely-held enterprise incorporate a business, the
corporation will issue stock. Stock is a security. Securities law com-
pliance will be necessary, and the risks of litigation and liability
under the securities law will be unavoidable. If those owners want to
avoid all that, they should form an LLC. The LLC, except under un-
usual circumstances, will meet the long-standing need for a limited
liability vehicle, well-adapted to closely-held enterprises, whose own-
ers will not own securities.
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